Conversations from the other side

Active measures against the editorial office of the exile magazine Svědectví

During its time, the editorial office of the exile magazine Svědectví in Paris was the target of dozens of active measures by the Czechoslovak intelligence service. One of the greatest and most dangerous took place in the early 1980s. In December 1980, Josef "Šembera" Šorčík, a member of → Section 31 of Directorate I of the FMV, together with the Hungarian exile Imré Gajdoš, installed a listening device transmitter under a desk in the editorial office of Svědectví. The recordings obtained were then used in several disinformation campaigns.

Fig. Windows above the entrance, former editorial office of Svědectví magazine in Paris.

We first learn about the possibility of use of a bug from a document sent by the Centre to the residentura in Paris on 4 July 1978. "After consulting the appropriate technical unit, purchase two identical briefcases for operation HNÍZDO1 which will serve as a container for carrying the technical equipment to be placed in the office of PREMIERA2 by collaborator TOMANSKÝ3.“4 During the initial stages of preparation for the operation against the editorial office of Svědectví, the Centre considered having the listening device installed by this agent, who had the trust of Pavel Tigrid because of his important position at Société Générale.  A transmitter measuring 35x4x2 cm was to be hidden in one briefcase. The other briefcase was to be used by Tomanský for normal purposes, so that those in the editorial office of Svědectví might get used to seeing it.5 Nearly a month later, on 2 August 1978, the Centre shared information that a receiver had been built into the personal vehicle of a member of the residentura.

"…For your information, on 14 July 1978, according to the plan submitted to the Centre by comrade Vodič 6, a suitable apparatus was mounted by the technical unit in a SIMCA – 1100 car, comprising a radio receiver with built-in LSK-419 I. cassette recorder, which was purchased for this purpose by the residentura. …We are enclosing a package containing an adapter that enables the receipt and decryption of the signal from the TD (technical device) and actual control of the listening device from comrade Vodič's car. For this purpose, two antennas are secreted in the dashboard.7 …We also confirm receipt of two ATTACHÉ briefcases, one of which will have a container built into it to house the TD (technical device) and for actual control of the listening device from comrade Vodič's car."

On 20 September 1978 already though, workers of Directorate VI of the FMV responded to the request of the intelligence services regarding what modifications were made to the car radio, because it had been stolen from the residentura vehicle. In the report, the intelligence service leadership indicated that it was not possible to determine for what the recorder in the car radio was to be used, and shared that the structural modifications were minimal, only one connector was added. Therewith, however, began a series of misfortunes associated with the planned operation.

Over the next few months, the Paris residentura tried to determine how the editorial office of Svědectví magazine worked, when Pavel Tigrid was there and when the office was empty. In November 1978, a meeting took place with agent Tomanský in Budapest to clarify when and under what conditions he would be willing to plant the listening device transmitter in the Svědectví editorial office. Tomanský proposed that the device be installed by residentura agents themselves, while he kept watch outside the building and stalled anyone potentially wanting to enter the editorial office. "You have the key, so you can go in yourself, and I can keep watch downstairs and stall or stop Gajdoš8 or anyone else from "HNÍZDO", if necessary"9 In his report on the meeting, agent Tomanský's handler noted that Tomanský obviously did not want to be involved in planting the listening device and he therefore did not even propose a date for handing over the listening device.
At another regular meeting on 3 December 1978, the resident informed Tomanský that they had been unable to unlock the editorial office of Svědectví using the key he had given them, which he had previously borrowed from Imré Gajdoš and had duplicated. Subsequently, the residentura proposed suspending further inspections around the editorial office of Svědectví.

In mid-December, residents discovered that the transmitter sent to the embassy in September and stored in a safe had been on and the batteries were completely flat. The residentura accused members of the intelligence directorate for technology of negligence in this regard, but failed to prove it. The intelligence service reassured itself that no classified information could have been leaked because the transmitter was in a safe, wrapped in aluminium foil, and "what's more the signal coming from the activated technical device was encrypted and can theoretically only be decrypted by very laborious, complex and expensive means" 10 In reality, decrypting the signal would have been quite simple even for the least experienced radio amateur, since the transmitter merely used reverse modulation. In mid-December, residents again attempted to open the doors of the Svědectví editorial office using six modified keys produced for them by locksmiths at the intelligence directorate for technology. These attempts were again unsuccessful.

At the end of January 1979, the Centre was asked if the listening device transmitter could be sent back to the CSSR so that technicians could replace the batteries, which had already begun to run down after four months. Interestingly, given the importance of operation, the intelligence directorate for technology did not have any batteries other than those normally available in shops in France. The transmitter was then transported back to France. In June, the transmitter was sent back to Czechoslovakia yet again and technicians again found that the transmitter's batteries were completely flat. This was the second time that the listening device had spontaneously turned itself on and begun operating without anyone knowing how it happened. "The "laťka" technical device, which was sent to the Centre by special AC [air courier] in May this year, was subjected to a technical inspection during power source replacement. During this check it was found that all power sources were completely drained, including the cell powering the PDO OLYMP. All evidence seemed to indicate that "laťka" had again been left on (transmitting) and had continued to operate until its power source was completely drained."11 No doubt, intelligence services all over the world make their fair share of mistakes and there are some mix ups and inaccuracies in their operations but surely only the StB could manage to leave its own listening device switched on at its own residentura. In the end, technicians had no choice but to detach the wires leading to the battery and train the residents, so that they could reattach them just before planting the listening device.

In early August 1979, the Centre proposed that some active measure be executed against the Svědectví editorial office, as even after more than half a year they had not managed to install the listening device, and suggested that they "throw a bomb with odorous gas or liquid into the office to prevent long-term human [!] occupation of the office".12 This idea was later realized under the code name Tchoř (Skunk).

Until July 1980, there had only been some reconnaissance around the editorial office and the residentura had still been unable to open the editorial office of Svědectví with the modified keys. In the summer of 1980, Imré Gajdoš visited Czechoslovakia. He was a cleaner at the Svědectví offices, and was contacted by intelligence staff and indicated he was willing to be involved in some form of cooperation. At that time, however, the resident in Paris responsible for monitoring Tigrid and Svědectví, Lt. Jaroslav "Paukert" Hrbáček, was under tight surveillance himself and therefore was not able to carry out any operations. 

On 29 August 1980, Minister of the Interior Jaromir Obzina approved the planting of a listening device in the editorial office of Svědectví. Thanks to Imré Gajdoš's time in Czechoslovakia, the intelligence service finally got hold of a key that could open the editorial office of Svědectví. Interestingly, in the intelligence service's report to the Minister of the Interior on the planting of the listening device they did not state the truth and instead said that it had obtained usable keys from agent Tomanský.13
Undercover as a UNESCO delegate, Josef "Šembera" Šorčík, a member of Section 31 of Czechoslovak intelligence travelled to Paris on 24 November 1980. He was tasked with installing the listening device together with Imré Gajdoš in the editorial office of Svědectví. After his return on 2 December 1980 he wrote a report on the execution of operation Hnízdo.

He first described his visits, which were to provide the cover story for his trip. Then he explains the planting of the listening device as follows: On 28 November 1980, after visiting UNESCO I headed out at 11:30. I didn't see anyone following me. RICH [the code name for Imré Gajdoš, who had a subfile within the main file for Svědectví – author's note] was seen leaving work at 18:05. Everything went according to plan, without any hiccups. I entered RICH's residence at around 19:25. We were not seen by anyone. We entered his apartment (a tiny room, very sparsely furnished). I instructed RICH to turn on the television… In the meantime, I put what I needed in my pocket and "wooden board" under my sweater. I left my jacket and suitcase in RICH's apartment. After RICH returned, I gave him instructions to check SVĚDECTVÍ. RICH did it and returned immediately, saying that it was possible to enter SVĚDECTVÍ. (We were taking a risk because RICH had told me in the restaurant that the caretaker did cleaning irregularly, sometimes at 20:00, sometimes at 21:00 and sometimes only at 22:00.) I immediately accompanied RICH to SVĚDECTVÍ's offices. No one saw us go in. RICH closed the doors and put the lights on in [Ms.] TIGRIDOVÁ's office. I walked into TIGRID's office and was able to orient myself immediately in the light of the flashlight that RICH was using and the light coming from [Ms.] TIGRIDOVÁ's office. The bookcase described by TOMANSKÝ was there along the wall of TIGRID's office, opposite the window looking over the street. I quickly tested whether "wooden board" could be placed in the designated place in the bookcase, under the wide bottom shelf (painted white on top).

The plank was thin and the spikes did not hold. When I pinned one side in and tried to pin the other side, the first spike popped out… So, after examining the tables, I decided to place "wooden board" between the middle drawers of TIGRID's table, where hopefully no-one worked. There was a gap between the drawers that was slightly wider than "wooden board".

But even here it wasn't possible to attach "wooden board". Whenever I pushed in the spikes, one side popped out… I was forced to lie down' on my back under the table and I instructed RICH to shine the flashlight… I set "wooden board" in place by screwing it in. It appeared to be firmly attached.  

…After completing the task, I returned with RICH to his place where I gave him 1,000 francs. He briefly and quietly repeated the outline of his trip to the CSSR and the CA [cover address – author's note]. I asked him to check TIGRID's office at a good time at night between Saturday and Sunday or between Sunday and Monday and to check the positioning of wooden board and whether the screws hadn't perhaps gone right through the top of the table. If everything looks fine, I told him not to touch anything.
I further pointed out that if anything is discovered, and he comes under suspicion, he should under no circumstances admit to the matter and should insist that he doesn't go to SVĚDECTVÍ to clean and that many different people go there, and vigorously deny any possible accusation.

RICH told me that I need not worry, that he was not afraid it would happen and that he would never admit to anything.

RICH gave me the addresses of people he had prepared for me in writing. He had copied them from envelopes that had been thrown in the bin. He did not know who they were and what relationship they had with SVĚDECTVÍ. He told me downstairs of his own accord that he would make spare keys to SVĚDECTVÍ, because he counted on the fact that TIGRID would ask him to give the keys back. I agreed that after some time he should give the keys back to TIGRID himself.

I embraced RICH at the end, who spontaneously, I think he was quite touched, reciprocated the gesture, and I left the building unseen by anyone, at around 19:50…


The operation was successfully completed thanks to the efforts and dedication of the whole team at the Paris residentura, in particular comrades PAUKERT and VODIČ, the relevant workers at the Centre, and excellent teamwork with the relevant officers of Section 42.“14

Fig. Archive record of Directorate I of the FMV, file reg. no. 12572 "HNÍZDO". Monitoring of the editorial office of Svědectví.


Thus, after nearly two years of efforts, the StB managed to plant a listening device in the editorial office of Svědectví. Now intelligence officers began to figure out how to use the recordings.
The StB made its first attempt to record a call in the editorial offices on 5 December 1980, from 17:00 to 18:15. Apart from normal editorial office noise, only one phone call was captured. However, they were able to verify that the device was working. From 9 December, recordings from the Svědectví editorial office were labelled as operation Gamma. Another attempt was made on 8 December. Only the movement of a person in the office was recorded. Three days later, the StB made another attempt at listening in, and on 11 December they listened in on Svědectví from 14:30 to 16:50, but learned nothing of value. The attempt on 16 December 1980, from 16:20 to 18:20 yielded the same results - “nothing learned”.15 

The next year, 1981, did not begin very promisingly. On 9 January, between 14:30 and 19:00 residents tried to listen in again, but after checking the cassette, they found that the transmitter could not be turned on. Four days later, the editorial office was tapped from 16:00 to 17:10, but again nothing useful was learned. 
On 8 January already, the Centre informed the residentura that it was necessary to make the best use of the listening device, for example by tasking the agency to visit Pavel Tigrid and recording these visits. The first usable recording was made only on 18 February between 16:25 and 18:35, when Pavel Tigrid spoke with several representatives of Czechoslovak exiles. Resident Jaroslav "Paukert" Hrbáček took the recording to Czechoslovakia himself. 
The following day the editorial offices were tapped from 14:30 to 19:45. At the beginning of March, Deputy Minister of the Interior of the CSSR Vladimír Hrušecký  requested a report on the results of operation Hnízdo. The report states that three interesting telephone conversations by Pavel Tigrid were intercepted, with Vilém Brzorád, Adolf Müller and George Minden.16

Fig. right - Deputy Minister of the Interior of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic from 1979 to 1988 Vladimír Hrušecký (1930); from 1962 – 1966 he had participated in active measures against the US in Djakarta as a member of Czechoslovak intelligence.

In November 1980, for the first time, the StB managed to check the arrival of a vehicle sent by Jan Kavan to Czechoslovakia, driven by Jiřina Šiklová in Czechoslovakia. Through Petr Uhl, the StB managed to infiltrate the system of receiving cars, planting its agent Pavel Muraško, who was imprisoned with Petr Uhl and had gained his trust. A first consignment of books and magazines took place under the control of the StB on 25 November 1980, and Pavel Muraško had a radio transmitter stitched into his jacket, so the secret police were able to closely monitor the entire operation. The complete unloading took place in Pavel Muraško's garage.17 The StB closely monitored the next arrival of the vehicle with contraband on 27 January 1981, where the operatives made a mistake and Jiřina Šiklová noticed the tail. It did not seem to concern her too much though and she merely took the documents she had with her to her workplace at Motol Hospital. During a brief meeting, she told the couriers to leave Czechoslovakia immediately. The StB officers did not admit that they had been detected and prepared a similar report to the one for the previous handover of a consignment.18 The StB thus carefully controlled the transport of materials. For several years already they had been able to control the content of materials smuggled into the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (ČSSR) when the carriers travelled through Vienna, as Pavel Tigrid's main collaborator in Vienna and the person who placed the contraband in the vehicle was an StB agent Ivo Šafář. If the route through Munich to Pilsen was chosen instead, the StB was kept partially informed by agent Oldřich Kupec, who was managed by the Military Counterintelligence Service and had the complete confidence of dissident and signatory of Charter 77 Jan Thoma.19 In light of the fact that in more than three months the residentura had managed to record only three of Pavel Tigrid's telephone conversations, the leadership of the Ministry of the Interior decided to hold up a consignment of printed materials and in this manner set off a widespread operation against both dissents and exiles. Accordingly, on the night of 27 April 1981, a vehicle carrying exile magazines and books, as well as address labels and a large amount of foreign currencies, was stopped in Dolní Dvoriště. The consignment also contained a copying device. Extensive investigations were initiated and many house searches were carried out. By resolution, StB investigator Jan Trkovský opened a file on 27 April for suspicion of commission of the crime "Subversion of the Republic" under Section 98 of the Criminal Code "based on a notification from the customs and passport control authorities on 27 April…"20 In actual fact, he had started the prosecution the day before, as the couriers had arrived in Dolní Dvořiště at half past eleven in the evening but their testimony was not written up until the following day. But this was just a minor hiccup in the operation set in motion by the StB. Although, following approval of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, top officials at the Ministry of the Interior had decided to seize consignments and begin an investigation, the recording device in agent Pavel Murasko's garage continued to be used by StB officers for several more days, probably due to the hope that the place might be used for hiding some samizdat materials. 

The Paris residentura listened in on Svědectví on 23 March from 16:30 to 18:30 and then again on 27 March between 16:30 and 18:30. Residents informed the Centre that reception from the car was of higher quality, but there was nowhere to park it. Again, no relevant information was obtained.21  In the instructions received by the Paris residentura on 29 April 1981, the Centre stated that, except in one case, no substantial knowledge had been gained. They suggested listening in on days other than only Mondays and Fridays, and instructing the agency to visit Svědectví while they were listening in. Firstly, as a means of checking on the agency, and secondly, to ensure some kind of dialogue would take place.22  Another attempt to record from the editorial office took place on 24 April from 16:00 to 18:00, but they weren't able to switch the transmitter on. Two days later they tried again. This time the transmitter could not be switched off. This was only achieved by driving the car very close to the editorial office. But in neither case was any interesting information obtained.

Due to interception of the vehicle containing literature, money and a copying device, which was officially announced by the Czech News Agency on 7 May 1981, the residentura began to use the bugging of the editorial office more intensively. It was at this time, however, that problems began to appear with the transmitter whose batteries were probably beginning to run low again. On 4 May, they listened in to the editorial office from 15:40 to 18:30. The transmitter was turned on with the apparatus housed in the car as it had a greater range than the other in the diplomatic briefcase. The batteries were already so weak that the briefcase was virtually impossible to use and could not be used to turn the transmitter on or off. The next recording attempt took place on 6 May from 15:30 to 18:30, however the transmitter could not be turned on. The following attempt was on 8 May from 14:50 to 17:15. The residentura informed the Centre that due to the implementation of operation Delta, operation Gamma, i.e. the listening device, was to be used as much as possible. The next recording was scheduled for 15 May, as Jiří Pelikán was to be in Paris. They listened in from 15:30 to 17:00. And again on 20 May between 15:15 and 17:00. Then on 22 May from 15:15 to 17:30. Three days later again, on 25 May, the editorial office was monitored from 9:30 to 11:15 and further from 15:30 to 18:00. The first recording of the following month took place on 3 June from 14:00 to 18:00. The next time, on 5 June, the listening device was turned on at an unspecified time and recording ended at 18:00. The next day when they listened in to Svědectví was on 10 June from 15:15 to probably 17:00, though the records incorrectly state 15:00. Residents claimed that the signal was already very weak and the sound quality was low. Another attempt to use the transmitter was made by the residentura on 30 June between 15:15 and 16:30. The operator noted that the signal was very weak and could only be detected from close proximity and in addition the frequency was "unstable". Further attempts were made on 1 July from 15:45 to 18:00, 8 July from 16:00 to 17:10, 10 July from 15:45 to 18:45, 15 July from 14:45 to 15:30, and on 17 July from 15:15 when the transmitter could no longer be turned on. Similarly, on 20 and 29 July it was not possible to activate the transmitter.

In the ongoing evaluation of the results of the planting of the listening device, residents stated that its usability was significantly impaired by Tigrid's irregular working habits. At the same time, the counterintelligence part of the StB obtained information that the magazine's editorial office would be moving to new premises. Another hurdle for the StB was the death of Imré Gajdoš in March and thus the impossibility of removing the listening device without significant risk of detection. The Centre considered assigning this task to agent Tomanský, but eventually decided against it.

In June, the proposal was first put forward to stop listening in on the editorial office, as it was to move to a new address. The Centre considered agent Kovanda as a suitable agent to remove the listening device.23  In the end, on 4 June the residentura received instructions regarding a final decision to leave the listening device in place. According to the technical department, the StB would be clearly identifiable if it were discovered, as most of the parts it contained were manufactured in Czechoslovakia, but the device was apparently already technologically outdated.

When the editorial office finally moved, the old furniture was taken to a dump and the listening device transmitter was never discovered.24

The StB now had several hours of recordings from the editorial office of Svědectví magazine. Some were directly related to consignments that had been held up and it was therefore possible to connect domestic opposition with exiles and accuse them of conspiracy. Through the upcoming process against Šiklová et al., the StB wanted to disrupt the conspiratorial connection between home and exiles over the long term.

The StB used recordings made by listening in, to create a series of disinformation programmes called Conversations from the Other Side. A similar programme called Calls from the Other Side about telephone conversations recorded in West Berlin by Czechoslovak intelligence agent Ervín Marák was broadcast on the radio in 1974.25  This was known as active measure SAKURA against Radio Free Europe and Czechoslovak exiles.

Active Measure SAKURA – radio transmission Calls from the Other Side (1974)

The programme Conversations from the Other Side was prepared by the editor of Czechoslovak Radio Petr Voldán and the first three episodes broadcast on 2.12.1981, 8.12.1981 and 17.12.1981 are in the archives of Radio Free Europe. The fourth part of the programme was not saved in the RFE archive. Virtually all usable sound recordings were edited and used in the radio programme. The entire apparatus of the Ministry of the Interior was tasked with monitoring the "public response" to this propaganda programme. Reports of counterintelligence, intelligence and military counterintelligence were combined into several memoranda for the Minister of the Interior of the CSSR, and the Chief of Intelligence.

Annex no. 1

Annex to no. A–00 649/31-1981

Operation H N Í Z D O – results.

So far, three interesting telephone conversations have been recorded, between TIGRID and Dr. BRZORÁD, A. MÜLLER and G. MINDEN, Head of the New York IAC (International Advisory Council), through which the CIA finances and organizes the transport of unfriendly materials through illegal channels to the USSR and other countries in the socialist community. Dr. Brzorád is a close collaborator of G. Minden.

The IAC has affiliates in London, Paris, Munich, Rome and Stockholm, and is largely responsible for financing, among others - as inferred from TIGRID's comments - the activities of TIGRID's "Svědectví" and the PELIKÁN's groups, including publishers INDEX and through them and the news agency PALACH PRESS in London.

The call with BRZORÁD and MÜLLER, who is a member of the LISTY group management and the chief executive of INDEX, concerned mainly the PALACH PRESS news agency, which is in a bad financial state. The impetus for the meeting was the efforts of the head of this agency, J. KAVAN, to obtain the necessary finances to pay its debts, especially from telephone calls to Czechoslovakia, and other running costs, which are of vital importance to him. The opinion of TIGRID - as well as PELIKÁN, the official director of PALACH PRESS, and others - is negative. As TIGRID told BRZORÁD, this business cannot be sustained, as PALACH PRESS cannot compete with other agencies and, even after paying its debts, it will soon find itself in the same unfortunate financial position again. 

However, PALACH PRESS could concentrate on continuing to make film reports and interviews with representatives of the “opposition” and on their use in the Western media, which could prove profitable.

A new piece of information for us is TIGRID's statement that KAVAN, apart from PALACH PRESS, also runs the so-called "Solidarity Fund", which manages the illegal transportation of materials and printed materials to and from Czechoslovakia. According to TIGRID, this activity is completely independent of the news agency and could require about three days' work, approximately once a month. The "Solidarity Fund" has no revenues or expenses and does not pay taxes, and only the actual costs associated with the transport of materials need to be covered; TIGRID stressed that he and PELIKÁN had paid all the debts of the "Solidarity Fund" and were willing to do everything possible to maintain its "delivery service". He further argued that O. ŠIK is also interested in maintaining this channel.

As inferred from TIGRID's telephone conversation, the problem is that, according to KAVAN, PALACH PRESS cannot be separated from the "Solidarity Fund" and that if the news agency is dissolved, he and his friends would also terminate the delivery service. TIGRID labelled this attitude of KAVAN as blackmail. To his mind KAVAN is unreliable because he does not want to acknowledge that PALACH PRESS has lived off of the "Solidarity Fund", whose existence is completely independent of the news agency. 

TIGRID's suggested solution is to have PALACH PRESS cease its activities and that KAVAN will be compensated with regular part-time remuneration of $ 800 per month. MINDEN's support has already been obtained, and he offered to contribute $ 200 a month to KAVAN until September 1982. The rest would be covered by a stakeholder pool. TIGRID also indicated during the call that MINDEN has sufficient funds and that his support and that of other components of their "joint venture" would be increased.

The "Solidarity Fund" channel is monitored by Directorate X of the SNB (operation DELTA)

Another interesting piece of information is TIGRID's view regarding MÜLLER's statement that the vehicle especially equipped for transporting printed materials to Czechoslovakia, has not yet returned to him (second half of February). Both assume that the vehicle was either involved in an accident or that the crew are using the vehicle for their private purposes. Given that TIGRID considers “Franta,” as he calls him on the phone, reliable, they are willing to wait and only if this is not resolved in the near future, will he and PELIKÁN intervene.

This finding confirms our previous information that František DRÁŽNÝ, who closely cooperates with M. HORÁČEK, both currently living in Frankfurt am Main, is involved in transporting printed materials to the CSSR in specially modified minibuses. Drážný is currently employed by DIALOG bookstore in Frankfurt, which cooperates with TIGRID and PELIKÁN's group and is the distributor for Czechoslovakia of A.L.I. (Associazione Letteraria Intenazionale), that is the Rome branch of MINDEN's IAC. TIGRID's conversation with MÜLLER also suggests that this connection to Czechoslovakia continues to be used.

TIGRID and MÜLLER further discussed the trip of the management of LISTY to the PRC. TIGRID appreciated the help that PELIKAN's friend, the Secretary General of the Communist Party of China, could provide, and asked whether it would be possible to discuss in Beijing the sending of printed materials to the CSSR via the PRC. If the Chinese agreed that their embassy in Prague could receive the consignments, according to TIGRID it would be possible to arrange to have someone pick them up. TIGRID stressed that it is essentially all the same for them to send parcels to Vienna or Beijing, as transport is still their weak point.

TIGRID also indicated during the telephone conversation that he had more plans whose implementation depends solely on money, especially "if Poland stays in the game". He is already beginning to believe that this “miracle” will be achieved. He stressed the role of students and pointed out that the situation in Hungary was also developing well in this regard. He therefore suggested that it is now clear in what direction it will be necessary to go over the next period. It will also be necessary to study carefully what the "limited lead role of the party" actually is. For the time being, he thinks that it is unacceptable under the old standards and that it is still necessary to wait for what the congress says. Given that 10 million people are involved in events in Poland, the "Prague Spring" seems like a fairy tale by comparison.

TIGRID also stressed that he had long ago written that only the workers could get the ball rolling in Socialist countries. He said further that this is also quoted in a pamphlet, 10 000 of which were sent to Czechoslovakia and Poland, where according to reports there was considerable response to this material.

Tigrid also spoke of an upcoming meeting of emigrants in Franken and complained that he was very busy with this event, although much of the work was being done at BELCREDI in Munich. It was inferred from another conversation that invitations to Franken were being taken care of by Vladimír BLAŽEK, whose article on the TV show “Escape and Expulsion” was published by Der Spiegel under the pseudonym W. PAUL. TIGRID also mentioned the views and activities of A. J. LIEHM, TESAŘ, PITHART and the arrival of J. VLADISLAV, with whom he intends to meet in the near future, and informed MÜLLER of other, less important matters.


Annex no. 226

Table of recordings in the editorial office of Svědectví 6, rue du Pont de Lodi, Paris 6, on which active measures were based for Czechoslovak radio:

Date listening device activated listening terminated






































15.30 transmitter could not be activated
























Activation time unknown




probably 17.00

















Transmitter could not be activated



Transmitter could not be activated



Transmitter could not be activated


Author: Radek Schovánek

1 Code name for the editorial office of Svědectví magazine. Cf. 12572/108

2 Code name of Pavel Tigrid in intelligence files after 1969. Cf. 12572/300 

3 Code name of intelligence agent Lubomír Chladil, born 13.9.1943, reg. no. 45244

4 Cf. 12572/108 microfiche 1 page 1

5 Ibid.

7 Cf. 12572/108 microfiche 1 page 3

8 Imré Gajdoš was a helper at the editorial office of Svědectví

9 Cf. 12572/108 microfiche 1 page 53

10 Cf. 12572/108 microfiche 1 page 75

11 Cf. 12572/108 microfiche 2 page 102

12 Cf. 12572/108 microfiche 2 page 103

13 Cf. 12572/108 microfiche 2 page 143

14Cf. 12572/108 microfiche 3 pages 182 – 208

15 Cf. 12572/108 microfiche 3 page 218

16 Annex no. 1, report of the chief of the intelligence service major general Karel Sochor for the Deputy Minister of the Interior of the ČSSR major general JUDr. Vladimír Hrušecký on 18 March 1981. Cf. 12572/108 microfiche 3 pages 235 - 238

17 Intelligence technician file 15670 code name Delta

18 Intelligence technician file 15518 code name Delta

19 Cf. Oldřich Kupec, born 27. 4. 1933 reg. no. 65590 code name Volha

20 Cf. ZV 488 MV

21 12572/108 microfiche 3 pgs. 242, 243

22 12572/109 microfiche 1 pg. 10

23 Real name Petr Podhrázký, reg. no. 47168

24 Personal disclosure of Ms Ivana Tigridová to the author.

26 Cf. 12572/108 – 109